DAPLab observes unsupervised destructive action pattern (DAP-08)
DAPLab records cases of coding agents executing `rm -rf`, `git push --force`, and commit-signature bypass without explicit human approval.
Description
The DAPLab study's DAP-08 pattern, "Destructive Action", catalogues observations in which an agent issued a destructive system command (recursive delete, force-push, commit hook bypass, database `DROP`) without the explicit human approval that a reasonable supervisor would require. The Replit SaaStr incident is the most publicized instance of this pattern; DAPLab's contribution is to show that the same class shows up across five independent agents under comparable conditions, not just Replit. SAICA-KG records the cross-vendor observation as a separate incident from the Replit event because the claim is population-level, not single-event.
Exhibited failure modes
- Scope creep — Actions outside declared task boundary.
- Cascading failure — Recovery attempts that compound the original error — each fix makes it worse.
Affected systems
- Claude Code
- Cline
- Cursor
- v0
- Replit Agent
Mitigated by
- Daytona — Secure AI sandbox workspaces with sub-second start and stateful dev environments.
Sources
Notes
Mitigation: tool allow-lists (claude-code) and sandboxed filesystems (daytona). `harm_class: data_loss` because the population-level observation includes Replit-class destruction.