LLM-hallucinated "huggingface-cli" package receives 30k downloads after proof-of-concept squat
Bar Lanyado (Lasso Security) found LLMs repeatedly hallucinated a `huggingface-cli` package; he registered it empty on PyPI and got 30K+ downloads in three months — first slopsquat PoC.
Description
In December 2023 Bar Lanyado of Lasso Security noticed that multiple generative-AI coding tools repeatedly recommended a nonexistent Python package `huggingface-cli` instead of the real `huggingface[cli]` extra. He registered the name as an empty, harmless package on PyPI. Over the subsequent three months it recorded 30,000+ real downloads, and by February 2024 Alibaba's GraphTranslator project had inadvertently instructed users to install it via its README. Lanyado published the experiment to demonstrate the viability of "slopsquatting" — the deliberate registration of LLM-hallucinated package names as a supply-chain attack vector. The experiment is cited in Spracklen 2024 as a seed observation for the formal slopsquatting study.
Exhibited failure modes
- Fabrication — Generating reference to non-existent APIs, packages, or symbols.
- Supply-chain attack — Slopsquatting, typosquatting, compromised MCP servers.
Affected systems
- GPT-3.5
- GPT-4
- Gemini Pro
- Alibaba GraphTranslator README
Mitigated by
- Socket — Dependency supply-chain scanner that inspects packages before install.
- Snyk — Vulnerability scanning for code, dependencies, containers, and IaC.
Documented by
Sources
Notes
The poisoned-payload scenario was not executed (Lanyado's package was empty on purpose) but the 30k download count is an independently verified measure of the blast radius. Canonical grounding incident for `supply_chain_attack` + `fabrication`.