Research Directions in Software Supply Chain Security
Laurie Williams, Giacomo Benedetti, Sivana Hamer, Ranindya Paramitha, Imranur Rahman, Mahzabin Tamanna, Greg Tystahl, Nusrat Zahan, Patrick Morrison, Yasemin Acar, Michel Cukier, Christian Kastner, Alexandros Kapravelos, Dominik Wermke, William Enck · 2025 · ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology
TL;DR
TOSEM roadmap paper on software supply-chain security: organizes attack vectors across dependencies, build infrastructure, and human factors; proposes a future research agenda. 54 citations.
Abstract
Reusable software libraries, frameworks, and components, such as those provided by open source ecosystems and third-party suppliers, accelerate digital innovation. However, recent years have shown almost exponential growth in attackers leveraging these software artifacts to launch software supply chain attacks. Past well-known software supply chain attacks include the SolarWinds, log4j, and xz utils incidents. Supply chain attacks are considered to have three major attack vectors: through vulnerabilities and malware accidentally or intentionally injected into open source and third-party dependencies/components/containers; by infiltrating the build infrastructure during the build and deployment processes; and through targeted techniques aimed at the humans involved in software development. This article provides an overview of current research efforts to secure the software supply chain and proposes a future research agenda to close software supply chain attack vectors.
Editorial notes
Anchors SAICA-KG's supply_chain_attack FailureMode in the SE-research mainstream. Useful citation backbone for slopsquatting/typosquatting claims and for positioning SAICA-KG against the broader SSC-security literature.