Supply-chain-hardened agent
socket (package-risk telemetry) → snyk (CVE scan) → daytona (sandboxed execution with signed MCP manifest). Intercepts hallucinated / malicious packages before they reach the dev machine.
Description
Composition for the `supply_chain_attack` FailureMode, targeting both the Spracklen/Lanyado slopsquatting class and classical CVE-poisoned dependency attacks. Stage 1: socket inspects every `install` candidate for risk signals (newly registered, typosquat distance to popular packages, suspicious maintainer patterns, install-time shell hooks). Blocks before download. Stage 2: snyk performs vulnerability scanning on packages that pass the socket gate, using both public CVE feeds and its own research database. Stage 3: daytona executes the agent's workflow inside a sandboxed dev environment so that even a slipped-through package cannot touch the host filesystem or credentials. Daytona's signed-manifest model ensures that the MCP servers the agent can reach are the ones the human approved.
Stack
Ordered composition. Each stage consumes the output of the one before it.
Targets failure modes
- Supply-chain attack — Slopsquatting, typosquatting, compromised MCP servers.
Notes
This is the Lanyado-style slopsquatting defense. Evidence tier `case_studied` because Socket and Snyk both publish case studies on their own mitigations; no independent benchmark against the Spracklen dataset yet exists.